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Abstract 
Charities often publicize generous contributions as a fund-raising strategy to 
encourage individuals to donate more. This paper presents a laboratory experiment to 
analyze the effect of social influence in charitable giving. I conjecture that different 
types of social information about other donors’ decisions will have different positive 
effects on donations, both to increase the proportion of positive donations and the 
total donations contribution. In a sample of one hundred and twenty one university 
students, social information regarding the mode contribution and information about 
randomly chosen contribution suggestively increases the proportion of positive 
donations and total donation amount. However, neither effect is statistically 
significant in this experimental design. 
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1. Introduction 
In the summer of 2014, one of the most famous and successful campaigns in 
fund-raising was launched on social media. It was the Ice Bucket Challenge, in which 
participants dumped a bucket of ice water on their own heads and then nominated 
others to do the same within 24 hours. If the nominated participants did not wish to do 
this challenge, they could forfeit by making a charitable financial donation to the 
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) Association, which is an organization that 
promotes awareness and researches into ALS. ALS Association (2015) reported that 
the Ice Bucket Challenge raised $115 million in 2014. Compared to $23.5 million in 
funds raised in 2013, it was a huge increase in both the number of new donors and 
total donation amount. List (2011) illustrated that the aim of charitable organizations 
is to develop strategies to attract resources and allocate those resources.  From this 
point of view, the Ice Bucket Challenge was a huge success. The reasons for the 
success of this donation activity may be that it harnesses competitiveness and  social 
media pressure, creates low barriers to entry, but also that it internalizes social 
influence in charitable giving. Individuals’ donation decisions are being influenced by 
information about their peers’ behaviour. 
 
Philanthropy New Zealand (2011) reported that New Zealanders give 1.35 percent of 
New Zealand’s GDP to charitable and community organizations. This magnitude 
donation presents the importance for investigating what influences donation behavior. 
More researchers study on charitable giving and find which fund-raising strategy will 
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increase donations. Various studies focus on theories of pro-social behaviour and 
charitable giving (Rabin, 1993; Bernheim, 1994; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004). 
There are several studies for information effect on charitable giving in the laboratory 
(Berg et al. , 1995; Clark, 2002; Smith, Windmeijer & Wright, 2011) and more 
economists bring out these experiments to the field which has a more natural setting 
(Frey & Meier, 2004; Martin & Randal, 2008; Carson & Shang, 2009; Carson & 
Shang, 2010). These studies provide policy recommendations to charities. 
 
By using social influence, charitable organizations implement fund-raising strategies 
that provide various types of information to encourage individuals to be more 
generous and donate more. For instance, online fundraising, such as justgiving.co.uk 
and gofundme.com, provide a full history of previous donations. In many galleries and 
museums, the total number of previous donation is visible in the transparent donation 
box. Martin & Randal (2008) run a field experiment at the Wellington City Art 
Gallery to investigate the potential differences between the actual and the perceived 
contents of the donation box. Several charities like The Chronicle annually tally and 
announce their top donations.  
 
The whole history of donation, the total donation amount and the top donation are 
different types of social information. By showing the whole history of donation, 
charity introduces a social norm to donors. Announcing the top donation or the last 
donation provide a signal of what the social norm is. However, it is not known if these 
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types of social information have different effects on donation behaviour. If so, it is 
important to study which particular type of social information makes people more 
generous and more likely to donate. This paper investigates the following question: 
Which type of social information makes individuals more generous and why? To 
address this research question, I design a laboratory experiment, run it and then 
analyze the data. In my experiment, I use a dictator game in which participants are 
dictators and charity is recipient. I introduce different types of social information in 
each treatment and compare the results using statistic methods. 
 
In my paper, I first review the literature on social influence, charitable giving and the 
dictator game, and then develop hypotheses about the effect of social information on 
charitable giving. I then describe my laboratory experiment that allows me to test my 
hypotheses. Finally, I describe my main results and provide some tentative policy 
implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
A number of recent experimental studies have focused on the effect of social influence 
and charitable giving (Carman, 2004; Croson & Shang, 2008; Servátka, 2009; Duffy 
& Kornienko, 2010; Servátka, 2010; Meer & Rosen, 2012). They found that 
individuals’ donation choices are affected by information about other people’s 
previous donation decision.  
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To investigate the relationship between social information and charitable giving, Berg 
et al. (1995), Cason and Mui (1998), Frey and Meier (2004), Alpizar et al. (2008), 
Krupka and Webber (2009), and Croson and Shang (2009) test various types of social 
information and mainly find that there is an increase of giving social information on 
the proportion of positive donations and amount given. Donors tend to be more 
generous when they are informed about previous donation choices. However, in all of 
these studies, the authors test the relationship between single type of social 
information and charitable giving. None of these studies compares different types of 
social information on charitable giving, particularly favorable ones. 
 
Introducing social information into the experiment, Berg et al. (1995) choose to 
provide the whole history of previous decisions. The authors run an investment game 
in the laboratory. In the second stage of their investment game, the authors introduce 
social information by providing the whole history of decisions in a previous baseline 
session. They find that participants in Room B (dictators) give more to participants in 
Room A (recipients) when they are given the whole history of allocation decisions 
from a previous session.  
 
Instead of observing the whole history of previous donations, the participants in 
Krupka and Weber’s (2009) information condition can observe four donation choices 
made by previous participants. In their study, participants have to make their decision 
in a dictator game, in which player A (the dictator) chooses option X (player A earns 
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$5 and player B earns $5) or option Y (player A earns $7 and player B earns $1). 
Krupka and Weber find that the percentage of participants who choose X in the 
information group is higher than that in the control group in which the dictators have 
no information about previous donations. These papers focused on the effect of 
showing the history of decisions made by previous participants. However, these 
studies by providing donation history, are unable to control the specific information 
participants provided. Participants observing the history of donation may be affected 
by a random donation, average or mode of donations. These authors do not have 
evidence to support which type of social information affect participants when they 
make their decisions. In my experiment, I provide a single type of social information, 
such as a randomly selected donation decision, and analyze this particular type of 
information by comparing the donation result with baseline treatment. 
 
Instead of announcing the donation amount, Frey and Meier (2004) provide the 
proportion of past students who chose to donate. In their study, students from the 
University of Zurich were asked at the time of paying their tuition whether they would 
contribute to a loan fund for foreign students. Frey and Meir varied the reported 
proportion of past students who had donated from 46% to 64%. They found that 
students were more likely to donate if shown the higher previous participation rate, 
which is 64% in this study.  
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Closer to my domain of inquiry, Cason and Mui (1998), Alpizar et al. (2008) and 
Croson and Shang (2009) only provide one type of social information to their 
participants. 
 
In 1998, Cason and Mui conducted a laboratory experiment in which they studied the 
social information effect in a sequential dictator game. They run a two-stage dictator 
game. In the first dictator game, participants make their dictator allocation with no 
social information. In the second stage, participants in baseline receive socially 
irrelevant information before they make their second dictator decision. Between the 
two dictator allocations, participants in the relevant information treatment receive the 
first dictator allocation chosen by one other participant. The authors find that 
participants on average become more self- regarding when not provided with any 
social information, and participants do not change their decisions when they receive 
the information about one other’s dictator allocation.  
 
Croson and Shang (2009) tested the effect of informing donors in the previous 
donation to a public radio station campaign. They provided the last donor’s amount 
and asked how much the current donor would like to donate. They varied the 
announced amount as $75, $180, $300 and found that donations significantly 
increased with higher announced amount. 
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Alpizar et al. (2008) explore the effect of providing participants with different 
previous modal donations on proportion of positive donations and the amount of 
giving. The authors run a natural field experiment at a national park in Costa Rica. 
They announced a previous modal donation before the participant make their 
voluntary contribution. The previous modal donations were $2, $5, $10 US dollars. 
Compared to the baseline treatment, the proportion of positive donations increased but 
the average donation decreased with a low mode, which are $2 and $5. A high mode, 
as $10, increased the average amount of donation. 
 
My study contributes to the literature by testing relevant effects of different types of 
social information on donations. In Cason and Mui (1998) and Croson and Shang 
(2009), the social information is the donation made by one participant. Alpizar et al. 
(2008) provide information about mode donation in a previous session. In my study, I 
design two social information treatments, which provide donation decision of one 
participant and mode donation in the previous session, and compare the results of 
these two treatments. 
 
3. Experiment Design and Procedures 
The goal of my experiment is to test the effectiveness of different types of social 
influence on charitable giving. Does observing one person’s donation generate social 
influence or is it necessary to have information on how much many other people 
donate for a social norm of donating to be internalized? 
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The experiment took place in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory 
(NZEEL) at the University of Canterbury. The experiment consists of four treatments 
to be described shortly, which are Baseline (B), Mode (M), Random (R) and Generate 
Information (G). One hundred and twenty one students agreed to participant in the 
experiment. Students were recruited using the ORSEE recruitment system (Greiner, 
2004). The experiment was advertised as a decision making task that would take half 
an hour. 
 
Once the participants entered the laboratory, they were seated at cubicles. After 
reading through the instructions aloud, I handed out envelopes containing $10 NZD 
(New Zealand dollars) to all participants.1 While the content of the envelope was 
always $10, the composition of this sum into bills and coins differed across treatments. 
Each participant was asked to open the envelope and check that it contained $10. In 
this decision making task, participants had an opportunity to donate none, some, or all 
of their $10 to the African project of World Vision New Zealand, which is a registered 
charity doing development work in poor countries overseas. 2  I informed the 
participants that I would forward all donations directly to World Vision and they were 
under no obligation to donate any money unless they wished to. Participants in this 
experiment were acting as dictators in a standard one-shot Dictator Game and were 
asked to allocate $10 in the envelope between themselves and the recipient, i.e. World 
                                                                 
1 The adult minimum wage in New Zealand at the time of the experiment was NZ$14.25 per hour. The 
instructions are provided in the appendix. 
2 More details about the African project for World Vision New Zealand are provided in the instructions attached 
in the appendix. 
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Vision New Zealand (similar to the baseline setting of Knowles & Servátka, 2015). 
Participants had a few minutes to make their donation decision, which was made by 
placing cash in the provided envelope. The participants were asked to seal the 
envelope once they decided on the amount of the donation. When all participants were 
done, they were called one by one to leave the laboratory and place their envelope in 
the donation box that was at the back of laboratory. 
 
To make participants’ decisions completely anonymous, I incorporated the 
double-blind procedures introduced by Hoffman et al. (1994), in which neither the 
experimenter nor the other participants could identify participants’ identities from 
their decisions. Using double-blind procedures can avoid biasing participants’ 
decision out of concern for their reputation or the threat of punishment from the 
recipients. As is explained in the experiment instructions, no one would know of any 
participant’s donation decision. Neither participants’ names nor their student ID 
number appeared on any form that recorded their decision. The participants who 
chose not to donate also put their empty envelope in the donation box. This proced ure 
made it impossible to detect whether a given participant made a donation or not. 
 
The experiment consists of four treatments and was run using an across-subjects 
design. The first treatment, Generate Information, was used to create the contribution 
information, which was later used in social influence treatments. In Generate 
Information, participants receive an envelope that contained two $5 notes. One of the 
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$5 presented the show up fee. The participant could decide whether or not to donate 
the other $5 to World Vision New Zealand. The amount $5 was chosen in order to 
provide a strong signal regarding previous donations. The social information in 
subsequent treatments would be higher than what participants would like give in the 
absence of a ‘high’ social norm. Average donations in double-blind dictator 
experiments without social information tend to be below 50% (eg. Hoffman et al. 
1994). 
 
The Baseline treatment, participants receive an envelope containing one $5 note, two 
$2 coins and one $1 coin. This distribution enabled a participant to choose to donate 
any whole dollar amount between $0 and $10. In Baseline treatment, there is no 
further information about other participants’ donation choices provided. This 
treatment serves as a control for comparisons with social information treatments. 
 
In the final two treatments, I introduced social influence by providing participants 
with information about the donations in the Generate Information treatment before 
making an actual donation. In the Mode treatment, participants receive the same 
distribution of money as in Baseline i.e. containing one $5 note, two $2 coins and one 
$1 coin. The only difference between Baseline and Mode was an additional 
information sheet in the envelope for the participants in the Mode treatment. The 
information sheet contained the following text:  
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In a previous session, most participants who chose to donate have given …$5…. (i.e. 
the most common donation) to World Vision New Zealand for doing development 
work in poor countries overseas.3 
 
The participants were asked to place their donation and the information sheet back 
inside the envelope before sealing it.  
 
In the Random treatment, the participants had the same distribution of money and 
envelope as in Mode. However, the information sheet in Random contained a different 
text than in Mode:  
 
In a previous session, a randomly selected participant who chose to donate has 
given …$5…. (i.e. the donation of one person) to World Vision New Zealand for doing 
development work in poor countries overseas.  
 
The information represents only one participant’s past choice, so the potential for 
social influence is weaker than that in Mode. 
 
The different experimental treatments are summarized in Table 1. By design, in 
Baseline and Generate Information, there is no social information. Mode and Random  
presents the same information that $5 was donated. In Random, $5 is information 
                                                                 
3 “$5” was  handwritten in both information sheets. 
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about one person’s donation, whereas in Mode, it is information about the modal 
donation. Rege and Telle (2001) presented that the social approval is felt more 
strongly when more the number of people adhering to this norm. In my experiment 
design, the information in Random represents a signal of social behavior, while that in 
Mode represents a social norm, which seems to have stronger effect and is more likely 
to be internalized. 
Table 1: Summary of Experimental Treatments 
Treatment Information Sheet 
Content of 
the 
Envelope 
Generate 
Information 
No information $5*2 
Baseline (B) No information 
$5+$2*2+$1 Mode (M) Most common previous donation ($5) 
Random (R) Randomly selected previous donation ($5) 
 
My testable hypotheses are summarized as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: P (B) <P (R) <P (M) 
P stands for the proportion of positive donations in different treatments. Hypothesis 1 
tests whether people will be more likely to donate when social information is 
provided. Introducing social information will increase the proportion of participants 
who choose to donate. The stronger the norm of the social information, the higher the 
proportion of positive donation, if the norm is higher than what the person would 
likely to give. 
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Hypothesis 2:μ(B) <μ(R) <μ(M) 
μ stands for the average of donation amount in different treatments. Hypothesis 2 
tests whether participants will donate more when receiving information about other 
donors’ decisions. The stronger the norm of the social information, the higher 
donations will be, if the norm is higher than what the person would likely to give.  
Social norm will be stronger when it represents the decisions of more people. 
 
Hypothesis 3: σ (B) >σ (R) >σ (M) 
The standard deviation of donations, which is presented as σ, will be smaller with 
social information. The donation amount will be closer to that provided in the social 
information and the standard deviation will be smaller. The stronger the norm of the 
social information, the smaller the standard deviation will be. 
 
4. Experimental Results 
To test my three hypotheses, I analyzed experiment results in two ways: the extensive 
margin (all data) and intensive margin (conditional giving). In the all data panel, all 
donations I collected from the experiment were analyzed. In the conditional giving 
case, I only used positive donations from the experiment. Summary statistics for each 
treatment are reported in Table 2 for both cases and Figure 1 presents the distribution 
of all donations in the three main different treatments. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Treatment 
Baseline 
(B) 
Mode 
(M) 
Random 
(R) 
Generate 
(G) 
Panel A: Extensive Margin (All Data) 
Number of observations 27 30 34 30 
Average donation 2.93 3.1 3.5 2.33 
Median donation 2 2 3 0 
Standard deviation 3.63 3.08 3.33 2.54 
Panel B: Intensive Margin(Conditional Giving) 
Number of positive donations 
18     
(66.7%) 
25       
(83.3%) 
25     
(73.5%) 
14          
(46.7%) 
Average donation conditional on giving 4.39 3.72 4.76 5 
Median donation conditional on giving 2.5 3 5 5 
Standard deviation conditional on giving 3.65 3.01 3 0 
Note: The proportion of positive donations  is given in parentheses, which is calculated as the number 
of positive donations divided by the number of participants . 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of Different Levels of Donations 
 
 
The mean donation in Baseline is $2.93 and 66.7% of participants give a positive 
amount to the charity. In Panel A (All Data), donations in Random are higher than any 
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of the treatments. In Panel B (Conditional Giving), Mode has the highest proportion 
of positive donations, at 83.3%, but surprisingly also has the lowest average donation. 
 
To test whether any of these differences are statistically significant, I move on to 
formal tests. Table 3 presents statistical tests of whether there are statistically 
significant differences across treatments. I run the standard t-test and Wilcoxon 
Rank-sum Test (non-parametric) for the difference between means. Because the data 
is not normal distributed, the more relevant test result is the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
Rank-sum Test which tests whether the two distributions are identical. To test whether 
the proportion of positive donations is statistically significantly different across 
treatments, I use the Fisher’s Exact Test. As Table 3 indicates, no pairwise comparison 
of treatments is statistically significant.  
Table 3: Significant Tests for Difference across Treatments 
Treatment Means t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank-sum Test 
Fisher's Exact 
Test for 
proportion of 
Positive Donations 
Panel A: Extensive Margin (All Data) 
B vs. M -0.19(0.845) -0.73(0.464) (0.218) 
B vs. R -0.64(0.522) -0.95(0.339) (0.585) 
M vs. R -0.49(0.621) -0.31(0.753) (0.381) 
Panel B: Intensive Margin (Conditional Giving) 
B vs. M 0.65(0.514) 0.56(0.570) 
 
B vs. R -0.36(0.716) -0.82(0.408) 
 
M vs. R -1.22(0.227) 1.45(0.146) 
 
Note: P-values in parentheses. 
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To test for differences in dispersion of giving across treatments, I also run a test for 
equal variances and show the results in Table 4. According to the pairwise comparison 
for equal variances shown in the table below, there is no statistically significant 
difference between treatments. 
Table 4: Standard Deviation Test for Difference across Treatments 
Treatment 
Panel A:Extensive 
Margin (All Data) 
Panel B: Intensive Margin 
(Conditional Giving) 
B vs. M 1.38(0.390) 1.47(0.376) 
B vs. R 1.18(0.640) 1.47(0.374) 
M vs. R 1.17(0.667) 0.99(0.995) 
Note: P-values in parentheses. 
 
Additionally, I also test for differences in donation decisions between treatments using 
regression analysis. In particular, I run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Tobit and Logit 
regressions to test for an effect of social information on donation decisions. In general 
form, the model I use is as follows: 
Yi =β0 +β1Xmode dummy +β2Xrandom dummy +εi             (1) 
where εi is a classical error term. 
 
The dependent variable Yi in my model is the donation amount chosen by individual i. 
Xmode dummy and Xrandom dummy are the dummy variables for Mode and Random  
treatments. For instance, Xmode dummy equals to 1 if individual A participated in Mode 
treatment, otherwise Xmode dummy equals to 0. β0 is the intercept term in the linear 
model and it represents the average donation in the Baseline treatment. β1 is the 
coefficient for the average additional amount contributed for Mode over the Baseline 
and β2 is the coefficient for the average additional amount contributed for Random  
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over the Baseline. In the logit regression, I test whether there is an increase for the 
proportion of participants who choose to donate. The summarized regression results 
are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5 Estimates of Donation Amount 
  
Panel A: Extensive Margin (All Data) 
Panel B: Intensive Margin 
(Conditional Giving) 
OLS Tobit Logit OLS Tobit 
β0 (Baseline) 2.92***(0.643) 2.16**(1.007) 0.69*(0.408) 4.389***(0.751) 4.28***(1.194) 
β1 (Mode) 0.17(0.887) 0.64(1.364) 0.92(0.638) -0.66(0.985) -1.47(1.582) 
β2 (Random) 0.57(0.862) 0.80(1.334) 0.33(0.564) 0.37(0.985) 0.54(1.554) 
N 91 91 91 68 68 
R2 0.006 0.001 0.021 0.021 0.007 
Note: standard error in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, there were many participants who chose not to donate with 
bunching of contributions at zero, and to a lesser extent at 10. So it is necessary to run 
a Tobit model that imposes an upper limit at 10 and a lower limit at 0. The Tobit 
results are qualitatively similar to the OLS results which shows in Table 5. 
 
The aforementioned tests and regression analysis lead to three findings summarized as 
follows: 
 
Finding 1 (based on Hypothesis 1): Social information does not significantly increase 
the proportion of positive donations. 
 
Support for Finding 1: Comparing the proportion of positive donations in the first row 
of Panel B (Conditional Giving) in Table 2, the proportion of positive donations 
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increases from 66.7% in Baseline to 73.5% in Random then to 83.3% in Mode. This 
observation appears to support Hypothesis 1, which is that the proportion of positive 
donations increased by introducing social influence in charitable giving. However, 
neither of these differences is statistically significant according to the Fisher’s Exact 
Test results reported in the third column of Table 3. Similarly, according to the Logit 
regression results in Table 5, the participants in Mode and Random are not 
significantly more likely to donate than participants in Baseline. While β1 and β2 are 
positive, they are not significantly different from zero. 
 
Finding 2a (based on Hypothesis 2): Providing social information does not 
significantly increase average donations. 
 
Support for Finding 2a: The average donations are $2.93 in Baseline, $3.50 in 
Random and $3.10 in Mode. These results seem to suggest that introducing social 
information increases the average donation, which supports the results in Croson & 
Shang (2009). However, the observed increase of average donation is not statistically 
significant according to the three test results in Panel A (All Data), Table 3. Moreover, 
the fact that the average donation is higher in Random than in Mode goes against the 
hypothesized effect that Mode provides a stronger social influence information than 
Random. Similarly the first two columns of Table 5, OLS and Tobit regression present 
the same results that Random appears to have a higher average donation than Mode, 
yet the difference is not statistically significant. 
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Finding 2b (based on Hypothesis 2): Social information does not increase the average 
of the donation amount conditional on donating. 
 
Support for Finding 2b: From the results in Panel B (Conditional Giving), Table 2, I 
find that introducing the previous modal donation as social information reduces rather 
than increases the average donation from $4.39 in Baseline to $3.72 in Mode, and that 
introducing random social information increases the average donation from $4.39 in 
Baseline to $4.76 in Random. The decrease of average in Mode presents the similar 
result in Alpizar et al. (2008). However, neither of these pairwise adjustments, 
provided in Panel B (Conditional Giving), Table 3 are statistically significant. The 
regression results from the last two columns in Table 5 thus support the conclusions 
above. 
 
Finding 3 (based on Hypothesis 3): Providing social information does not 
significantly decrease the standard deviation for all data and conditional on giving. 
 
Support for Finding 3: Table 4 presents the test results for variance tests across 
treatments. Across Panel A (All Data) and Panel B (Conditional Giving), the standard 
deviation in Random appears bigger than that in Mode, and smaller than that in 
Baseline. Although direction of effect supports Hypothesis 3, the differences are not 
statistically significant. 
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After all these findings, there is an auxiliary result finding. In Figure 1, there are huge 
increases for number of participants who choose donate exact $5 in Mode and 
Random treatments comparing with that in Baseline. To test for these increases in 
number of participants who choose to donate $5, I run OLS, Tobit and Logit 
regressions in both panels, which are all data and conditional giving. In general form, 
the model I use is as follows: 
Yi =β0 +β1Xmode dummy +β2Xrandom dummy +εi             (2) 
where εi is a classical error term. 
 
The dependent variable Yi in my model is the absolute value of deviation of 
contribution from $5 for individual i. Xmode dummy and Xrandom dummy are the dummy 
variables for Mode and Random treatments. For instance, Xmode dummy equals to 1 if 
individual A participated in Mode treatment, otherwise Xmode dummy equals to 0. β0 is 
the intercept term in the linear model and it represents the average absolute value of 
deviation of contribution from $5 in the Baseline treatment. β1 is the coefficient for 
the average additional absolute value of deviation of contribution from $5 for Mode 
over the Baseline and β2 is the coefficient for the average additional absolute value of 
deviation of contribution from $5 for Random over the Baseline. In the logit 
regression, I test whether there is an increase for the proportion of participants who 
choose to donate exactly $5. The summarized regression results are reported in Table 
6. 
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Table 6 Estimates of Donating Exactly $5 
  
Panel A: Extensive Margin (All Data) 
Panel B: Intensive Margin 
 (Conditional Giving) 
OLS Tobit Logit OLS Tobit Logit  
β0 
(Baseline) 
3.85***(0.353) 3.79***(0.420) -2.52***(0.735) 3.28***(0.420) 3.16***(0.535) -2.08***(0.75) 
β1 (Mode) -0.82*(0.486) -0.99*(0.583) 1.34(0.852) -0.64(0.551) -0.85(0.708) 1.13(0.872) 
β2 
(Random) 
-0.82*(0.472) -1.00*(0.567) 1.35(0.839) -0.96*(0.551) -1.24*(0.711) 1.32(0.864) 
N 91 91 91 68 68 68 
R2 0.042 0.01 0.042 0.045 0.011 0.038 
Note: standard error in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
There is suggestive evidence that both Mode and Random treatments increase the 
likelihood of participants giving exactly $5 (or equivalently reducing the distance of 
contributions away from $5), though it tends to be significant at no better than the 10% 
level.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper studies the effect of social influence in charitable giving. In particular, I 
ask what type of social information makes people more likely to donate, or donate 
more. To answer this question, I run a laboratory experiment with a dictator game 
where the recipient is a charity. Social information in my experiment was introduced 
by providing information about other participants’ donations. I find no statistically 
significant results in my data analysis, using either all data or that which is conditional 
on positive donations. Social information treatments appear to increase the proportion 
of positive donations, compared to the baseline treatment that has no social 
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information; however, this increase is not statistically significant. In terms of policy 
implications, I have found no support for my hypothesis of social influence having a 
positive effect on proportion of positive giving or more donations. The other result I 
could find is that use of specific past donation numbers drive a significant increase in 
the proportion of people who give that exact amount, without affecting the incidence 
or amount of giving overall. 
 
One reason for the lack of significant results may be the calibration of this experiment. 
In particular, the social information I provided to the participants in Mode and 
Random, $5, was perhaps too high to be credible, compared with the average donation 
in Baseline. Social influence may have had a stronger effect when I calibrated the 
experiment differently. For example, generating and providing information that the 
previous random or mode donation was equal to $3 or $4, which is closer to the actual 
average donation in Baseline, may have had an effect. This could possibly sway 
non-donors to donate a small amount rather than nothing. Unfortunately, there is no 
theory that provides guidance in setting the appropriate calibration. Further 
experimentation would be needed to test different calibrations.  
 
The relatively small sample size might be another reason for the results not being 
statistically significant. With a treatment sample size of 30 in between subject tests, it 
might be harder to detect treatment differences in the current setting as the effect of 
social influence might be quite subtle. Alternatively, the effects of social influence 
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might be easier to detect in a different environment, for example where participants 
are informed in more detail about how the social influence information was generated. 
 
According to the data from Figure 1, there were more participants in Mode and 
Random who chose to donate $5 than that in Baseline. There may be many reasons for 
this result. One of them is that participants were affected by social influence to mildly 
adjust donations upwards. Another reason may be that the participants directly took a 
cue from the $5 information and directly matched it to $5 as a simple shortcut. It 
could also be an ‘anchoring’ effect unrelated to social comparison. Ariely, 
Loewenstein & Prelec (2003) found that anchoring effect can increase individual’s 
willingness to pay. In my experiment, $5 may have become the anchor when 
participants saw it on the information sheet. Further research can use experiments to 
separate anchoring effect from social influence. 
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7. Appendices 
Appendix A: Instruction for the Baseline Treatment 
Instructions  
Thank you for participating in this research project.  
 
From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature 
with other participants is prohibited. If you violate this rule, we will have to exclude 
you from the experiment and from all payments. If you have a question after we finish 
reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private.  
 
Donation  
We will shortly hand out to you an envelope containing $10. You can either keep this 
$10 for yourself, or donate some, or all of it to World Vision New Zealand, who are a 
registered charity doing development work in poor countries overseas. We will 
forward all money directly to World Vision. World Vision will use this money to 
provide vaccinations to protect children in poor countries (e.g. in African countries 
like Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) against measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, 
hepatitis, polio and tetanus. These disease cause many children to die every year, but 
are easily preventable. The envelope contains a $5 note, two $2 coins and a $1 coin, 
so it is possible to donate any whole dollar amount, between $0 and $10 to World 
Vision. You are under no obligation to donate any money to World Vision unless you 
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wish to do so.  
 
After you made the donation decision, please put the money you wish to donate back 
in the envelope and seal it. We suggest you put any money you have decided to keep 
in your pocket or bag. We will give you a minute to do this.  
 
Anonymity  
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that 
no-one will ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is 
guaranteed because neither your name nor your student ID number will appear on any 
form that records your decisions.   
 
Receipt  
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the 
back of the lab and sign a receipt acknowledging that you were given $10. When you 
have done this, please place the envelope, whether you have chosen to donate any 
money or not, in the donation box sitting at the back of the lab and leave the lab 
afterwards. Please do not wait around outside the lab once you have done this. 
 
Thank you once more for taking part in this research project. 
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Appendix B: Instruction for the Mode Treatment 
Instructions  
Thank you for participating in this research project.  
 
From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature 
with other participants is prohibited. If you violate this rule, we will have to exclude 
you from the experiment and from all payments. If you have a question after we finish 
reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private.  
 
Donation  
We will shortly hand out to you an envelope containing $10. You can either keep this 
$10 for yourself, or donate some, or all of it to World Vision New Zealand, who are a 
registered charity doing development work in poor countries overseas. We will 
forward all money directly to World Vision. World Vision will use this money to 
provide vaccinations to protect children in poor countries (e.g. in African countries 
like Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) against measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, 
hepatitis, polio and tetanus. These disease cause many children to die every year, but 
are easily preventable. The envelope contains a $5 note, two $2 coins and a $1 coin, 
so it is possible to donate any whole dollar amount, between $0 and $10 to World 
Vision. You are under no obligation to donate any money to World Vision unless you 
wish to do so.  
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After you made the donation decision, please put the money you wish to donate back 
in the envelope and scale it. We suggest you put any money you have decided to keep 
in your pocket or bag. We will give you a minute to do this.  
Information about Previous Donations 
With the money inside the envelope, there is an information sheet. It shows how much 
most participants who chose to donate in a previous session have given to World 
Vision (i.e. what the most common donation was). 
 
Anonymity  
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that 
no-one will ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is 
guaranteed because neither your name nor your student ID number will appear on any 
form that records your decisions.   
 
Receipt  
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the 
back of the lab and sign a receipt acknowledging that you were given $10. When you 
have done this, please place the envelope, whether you have chosen to donate any 
money or not, in the donation box sitting at the back of the lab and leave the lab 
afterwards. Please do not wait around outside the lab once you have done this. 
 
Thank you once more for taking part in this research project. 
 31 
 
Appendix C: Instruction for the Random Treatment 
Instructions  
Thank you for participating in this research project.  
 
From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature 
with other participants is prohibited. If you violate this rule, we will have to exclude 
you from the experiment and from all payments. If you have a question after we finish 
reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private.  
 
Donation  
We will shortly hand out to you an envelope containing $10. You can either keep this 
$10 for yourself, or donate some, or all of it to World Vision New Zealand, who are a 
registered charity doing development work in poor countries overseas. We will 
forward all money directly to World Vision. World Vision will use this money to 
provide vaccinations to protect children in poor countries (e.g. in African countries 
like Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) against measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, 
hepatitis, polio and tetanus. These disease cause many children to die every year, but 
are easily preventable. The envelope contains a $5 note, two $2 coins and a $1 coin, 
so it is possible to donate any whole dollar amount, between $0 and $10 to World 
Vision. You are under no obligation to donate any money to World Vision unless you 
wish to do so.  
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After you made the donation decision, please put the money you wish to donate back 
in the envelope and scale it. We suggest you put any money you have decided to keep 
in your pocket or bag. We will give you a minute to do this.  
Information about Previous Donations 
With the money inside the envelope, there is an information sheet. It shows how much 
a randomly selected participant who chose to donate in a previous session have given 
to World Vision (i.e. what the donation of one person was). 
 
Anonymity  
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that 
no-one will ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is 
guaranteed because neither your name nor your student ID number will appear on any 
form that records your decisions.   
 
Receipt  
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the 
back of the lab and sign a receipt acknowledging that you were given $10. When you 
have done this, please place the envelope, whether you have chose n to donate any 
money or not, in the donation box sitting at the back of the lab and leave the lab 
afterwards. Please do not wait around outside the lab once you have done this. 
 
Thank you once more for taking part in this research project. 
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Appendix D: Instruction for the Generate Information Treatment 
Instructions 
Thank you for participating in this research project. 
 
From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature 
with other participants is prohibited. If you violate this rule, we will have to exclude 
you from the experiment and from all payments. If you have a question after we finish 
reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private.  
 
Donation 
We will shortly hand out to you an envelope containing two $5 notes. When you 
receive the envelope, please open it up and check that there are two $5 notes in it. One 
of the $5 notes is your show-up fee and you can either keep the other $5 for yourself, 
or donate to World Vision New Zealand, who are a registered charity doing 
development work in poor countries overseas. We will forward all money directly to 
World Vision. World Vision will use this money to provide vaccinations to protect 
children in poor countries (e.g. in African countries like Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda) against measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, hepatitis, polio and tetanus. 
These disease cause many children to die every year, but are easily preventable. You 
are under no obligation to donate any money to World Vision unless you wish to do 
so. 
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After you made the donation decision, please put the money you wish to donate back 
in the envelope and seal it. We suggest you put any money you have decided to keep 
in your pocket or bag. We will give you a minute to do this. 
 
Anonymity 
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that 
no-one will ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is 
guaranteed because neither your name nor your student ID number will appear on any 
form that records your decisions.  
 
Receipt 
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the 
back of the lab and sign a receipt acknowledging that you were given $10. When you 
have done this, please place the envelope, whether you have chosen to donate any 
money or not, in the donation box sitting at the back of the lab and leave the lab 
afterwards. Please do not wait around outside the lab once you have done this. 
 
Thank you once more for taking part in this research project. 
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Appendix E: Information Sheet for the Mode Treatment 
Information Sheet 
In a previous session, most participants who chose to donate have given …$5…. (i.e. 
the most common donation) to World Vision New Zealand for doing development 
work in poor countries overseas. 
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Appendix F: Information Sheet for the Random Treatment 
Information Sheet 
In a previous session, a randomly selected participant who chose to donate has 
given …$5…. (i.e. the donation of one person) to World Vision New Zealand for 
doing development work in poor countries overseas. 
 
